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Paul Maddrell 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the relationship between the foreign intelligence service of the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Hauptverwaltung A (Main Directorate A, 
or HVA) and the First Chief Directorate (FCD) of the Soviet Union’s Committee of 
State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti, KGB) and how it changed 
over time from the early 1950s until the GDR’s collapse in 1989-90.1 It analyzes 
cooperation in intelligence collection and in influence operations (“active measures,” 
as both communist services called them), and considers the sense of identity of the 
intelligence officers on both sides that underpinned this cooperation.  
 
Both the HVA and FCD were foreign intelligence services that collected clandestinely 
obtained information (human intelligence, known as Humint) from networks of agents 
abroad. They also sought to influence the politics of the states they targeted. They 
were relatively small divisions of large security agencies - the KGB, in the FCD’s 
case, and the Ministry of State Security (Stasi, standing for Ministerium für 
Staatssicherheit), in the HVA’s case. The Stasi was a security and intelligence service 
built on the Soviet model: domestic security and foreign intelligence collection were 
                                                 
1 The HVA bore the letter “A” in emulation of the FCD’s status within the KGB as 
the First Chief Directorate: see Helmut Müller-Enbergs, Hauptverwaltung A (HV A). 
Aufgaben – Strukturen – Quellen (Berlin, 2011), 41.  
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inseparable from one another. The objectives of the state security service were the 
maintenance of communist rule at home and destabilization of the “class enemy” 
abroad. In the GDR’s case, the main “class enemy” was the Federal Republic of 
Germany (or West Germany), which was far and away the HVA’s main area of 
operation.2  
 
The basic aim of HVA-FCD relations was the communization of Germany. The FCD 
collaborated with the HVA to infiltrate and subvert the Federal Republic. The FCD’s 
policy towards the Federal Republic was no different from its policy towards any 
other Western or nonaligned state: infiltration and subversion. However, the FCD did 
not have to operate alone against the Federal Republic; the GDR was a natural 
bridgehead. West Germany could most easily be infiltrated and subverted by East 
Germans. This led to the creation of the HVA in 1951. Thereafter, the FCD 
cooperated closely with it.  
 
In short, like the other satellite services, the HVA played a role in the geographical 
division of the labor of undertaking intelligence collection and subversion. The HVA 
was the most important satellite intelligence service, partly because it was the most 
successful of them and partly because it operated against the most important Western 
European state, the Federal Republic. The HVA’s areas of operation were the Federal 
Republic and West Berlin, certain regions of Third World and, to some extent, the 
USA. It was successful in collecting in West Germany a huge amount of valuable 
political, economic, military, scientific, and technological information. The 
                                                 
2 Peter Siebenmorgen, “Staatssicherheit” der DDR. Der Westen im Fadenkreuz der 
Stasi (Bonn, 1993), 98-100.  
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consumers of this information in the GDR proved less able to make good use of it. 
The HVA also had some limited success in influencing West German politics.  
 
The HVA was more than a foreign intelligence service. It was a secret instrument by 
which the GDR’s communist regime sought to interfere in and influence politics in 
West Germany. Its intelligence collection was meant to alter the balance of power 
between East and West in favor of the former. Intelligence collection from spies was 
its main task. What it chiefly sought from them were classified documents. At its 
peak, in the 1970s and early 1980s, its intelligence collection focused above all on 
obtaining political information on the Federal Republic’s government and political 
parties; political and military information on alliances of which the Federal Republic 
was a member, chiefly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
European Economic Community (EEC); and scientific and technological intelligence 
(S&TI), above all scientific research and data relating to advanced weaponry. By this 
time, it was collecting much valuable information on American targets in West 
Germany and West Berlin, although the Federal Republic always remained its 
principal target. As this tasking shows, it was very much a Soviet vehicle for 
strengthening the Warsaw Pact and its weaponry against the NATO threat. The S&TI 
collected was used in Soviet and East German weapons development. The military 
intelligence collected was passed to the GDR’s armed forces and the Soviet Ministry 
of Defence. In practice, the HVA collected intelligence for the Soviet Union’s 
General Staff, Ministry of Defense and military-industrial complex, via the KGB 
residency in Karlshorst.3 
                                                 
3 Jens Gieseke, Der Mielke-Konzern. Die Geschichte der Stasi, 1945-1990 (Munich, 
2006), 218.  
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The HVA also engaged in counterintelligence, seeking to penetrate hostile 
intelligence services—those of West Germany, the United States and other NATO 
states—to gain intelligence on their operations and capabilities. It was very successful 
in penetrating West Germany’s foreign intelligence service, the 
Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service, BND), and security service, 
the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution, BfV), and severely impaired their ability to operate effectively against 
the GDR. Above all, the HVA’s counter-intelligence successes protected its own spies 
in West Germany: its agents in the counter-intelligence units of the BND and BfV 
revealed to it any developing security risk. The HVA also conducted extensive 
subversion and disinformation, particularly in West Germany. It was active outside 
Europe, sending advisers and instructors to selected Third World countries and 
national liberation movements.4 
 
The forms cooperation took 
 
The relationship between the HVA and the FCD developed over time. A relationship 
of dependence and subordination had, by the late 1950s, given way to a more equal 
relationship, which was maintained until the HVA was dissolved in 1990 and KGB 
officers were allowed by the government of the Federal Republic to destroy most of 
the HVA’s archive.  
 
                                                 
4 Siebenmorgen, “Staatssicherheit” der DDR, 120-21.  
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Most cooperation between the FCD and the foreign intelligence services of the Soviet 
Union’s satellite states took place bilaterally. There were also multilateral conferences 
every four years, involving all the Eastern European services and the Cubans as well. 
The last was in East Berlin in 1988.5 Multilateral conferences on the subject of active 
measures took place every year; there were many bilateral meetings as well.  
 
Bilateral cooperation ensured that the Russians dominated the relationship and 
cooperation served principally their interests. For this reason, cooperation in all fields 
between the Soviet Union and its satellites tended to be bilateral. There was no 
alliance organization which united the intelligence services of all the satellites, 
serving as a counterpart to the Warsaw Pact Organization.6 Nor was there one type of 
bilateral relationship between the KGB and the satellite services. Relations between 
them varied in closeness. The KGB’s relationship with the Bulgarian Interior Ministry 
was even closer than its relationship with the Stasi and was one of complete 
subordination; the ministry was a dependency of the KGB. The Stasi was not only 
responsible to the KGB, of course; the leadership of the GDR’s ruling communist 
party, the SED, also had a large say in intelligence matters.7  
 
The FCD’s superiority over the HVA was both intellectual and practical. The East 
German officers were from the origins of their service steeped in the intelligence 
                                                 
5 Werner Großmann, Bonn im Blick (Berlin, 2001), 160. The states whose intelligence 
services met there were the USSR, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Cuba, Vietnam, and Mongolia (Romania was not invited).  
6 Siebenmorgen, “Staatssicherheit” der DDR, 107.  
7 See the chapter by Walter Süß in this volume.  
 6 
tradition of the Soviet Union. The sense of identity which Soviet intelligence officers 
had was passed on to them. Since the GDR was a communist state, they were 
committed to serving the cause of communism. Soviet intelligence officers regarded 
themselves as the Communist Party’s élite special fighters, or “Chekists” (after the 
first Soviet security and intelligence service, the Cheka, which was founded just after 
the Russian Revolution took place in November 1917). It was their job to spread the 
revolution.8 
 
The HVA’s subordination to the FCD was also practical. Plans for intelligence 
collection and active measures were drawn up by the leaderships of the HVA and 
FCD in Moscow. The FCD, as the senior partner, had the larger say in them. Above 
all, they served the interests of the USSR.  
 
Cooperation took many forms. Firstly, annual plans were prepared in Moscow, for 
influence operations (“active measures”) as well as foreign intelligence collection. 
This reflected communist practice in both the USSR and the GDR; everything was 
planned. The HVA leadership liaised with the FCD leadership and then passed on 
instructions to the various divisions of the service. Each department in the HVA dealt 
with its FCD counterpart and agreed on operations. Each also reported on operations 
and their success. Naturally, the FCD reported this success on to its leadership as its 
own, which created resentment among HVA officers. The FCD was a very 
bureaucratically minded partner: every operation planned by the HVA had to be made 
known to it by a proposal or at least by letter. Nevertheless, cooperation was genuine. 
                                                 
8 Jens Gieseke, Die hauptamtlichen Mitarbeiter der Staatssicherheit: 
Personalstruktur und Lebenswelt, 1950-1989/90 (Berlin, 2000), 127-28. 
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The FCD laid down the general character of operations, and the HVA devised 
operations that fit this bill.9 
 
Cooperation extended beyond the planning stage. There were joint operations, both in 
Humint collection and active measures. There were also operations running in 
parallel. Each side, in time, learned from the other. In the 1950s, the HVA, like the 
rest of the Stasi, learned its trade from the KGB, but the FCD proved willing to learn 
from its East German partners as well. The HVA and the rest of the Stasi also gave 
much valuable assistance to FCD operations to penetrate the Federal Republic. For 
example, they supplied the Karlshorst residency with East German “illegals” and 
agents.10 
 
                                                 
9 On the nature of this cooperation, see David Childs & Richard Popplewell, The 
Stasi: The East German Intelligence and Security Service (Basingstoke, 1996), 124-
26; Hubertus Knabe, Die unterwanderte Republik. Stasi im Westen (Berlin, 1999), 
113-16; Müller-Enbergs, Hauptverwaltung A, 108. See also Markus Wolf, 
Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg: Erinnerungen (Munich, 1997), 332.  
10 Dirk Dörrenberg, “Erkenntnisse des Verfassungsschutzes zur Westarbeit des MfS,” 
in Das Gesicht dem Westen zu ...: DDR-Spionage gegen die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, ed. Georg Herbstritt & Helmut Müller-Enbergs (Bremen, 2003), 88. 
“Illegal” was the Soviet intelligence term for an agent with a false identity in a 
targeted country who thus had no apparent connection to the Soviet government. 
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The HVA also handed over huge quantities of intelligence, much of it high-grade, to 
the FCD. This was a one-sided arrangement; the Russians gave little in return.11 
Almost all important information was sent to the FCD directly by the collection and 
analysis departments of the HVA.12 Indeed, the Federal Republic was the only 
Western state on which the FCD received more high-grade intelligence from a partner 
service than it collected itself. All the HVA concealed from the Russians were the 
identities of its intelligence sources or agents of influence.13 However, the KGB had 
                                                 
11 There are examples of information flow in the other direction. From the late 1960s 
to the late 1980s, the FCD supplied the HVA every month with intelligence 
assessments: see Müller-Enbergs, Hauptverwaltung A, 145. The FCD also provided 
intelligence obtained from its penetration agents in Western secret services to the 
counterintelligence services of the Soviet Bloc, including the Stasi, so that they could 
arrest Western spies. Intelligence obtained from Kim Philby and George Blake, the 
FCD’s agents in Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, and Heinz Felfe, its agent in the 
BND’s forerunner, the Gehlen Organization, was used in 1953-55 to do severe 
damage to those services’ spy networks in the GDR: see Paul Maddrell, Spying on 
Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945-1961 (Oxford, 2006), 145.  
12 Gieseke, Der Mielke-Konzern, 218; Günter Bohnsack, Hauptverwaltung 
Aufklärung. Die Legende Stirbt (Berlin, 1997), 65-67. 
13 Bohnsack, Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, 35. There seem to have been exceptions 
to this rule. The Russians were very impressed by the intelligence provided by a 
parliamentary whip of West Germany’s Social Democratic Party, Karl Wienand, and 
made an unsuccessful attempt to recruit him: see Christopher Andrew & Vasili 
Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West (London, 1999), 
589-90.  
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its own network of sources in both the GDR and the Stasi and learned much that was 
not officially reported to it.14 
 
Liaison and visits to one another were important to cooperation. An indication of how 
valuable the FCD considered liaison with the HVA to be is that its liaison officers 
were posted to East Berlin for long periods of time (usually about five years). Liaison 
was as one-sided as the transfer of intelligence. The FCD officers had HVA identity 
cards and could therefore visit the HVA department for which they were responsible 
whenever they wanted to. However, the HVA’s officers could not visit the KGB 
headquarters in Berlin-Karlshorst whenever they wanted to. The KGB leadership also 
discouraged its staff from having private dealings with HVA officers. “German-
Soviet friendship” was more propaganda than reality. Communication between the 
FCD and HVA was very frequent, however. The latter received correspondence about 
operations from Moscow every day.   
 
The development over time of cooperative work between the HVA and FCD 
 
Although the HVA’s relationship with the FCD became a more equal relationship at 
the end of the 1950s, it never became one of full equality or partnership; the East 
Germans remained junior partners of the Russians.  
 
There were no partner intelligence services in the USSR’s satellite states in the years 
immediately after 1945. Neither satellite regimes nor satellite intelligence agencies 
                                                 
14 Günter Bohnsack & Herbert Brehmer, Auftrag: Irreführung. Wie die Stasi Politik 
im Westen machte (Hamburg, 1992), 41.  
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had come into being, and the USSR’s intelligence agencies operated alone. Soviet 
intelligence policy was then far-sighted and long-term. As Moscow saw it, the Second 
World War was over, but the international class struggle was not. From the Soviet 
Zone of Germany, the KGB’s forerunner, the MGB, pursued a policy of mass 
infiltration of agents into the Western Occupation Zones. The USSR’s military 
intelligence service, the GRU (Glavnoye Razvedivatelnoye Upravleniye: Main 
Intelligence Directorate), which was subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, was also 
very active in infiltrating agents into Western Europe. American military intelligence 
interrogators in West Germany concluded in 1947 that the GRU was trying to create a 
large network of agents in Western Europe operating under commercial cover. One of 
the interrogators involved, Arnold Silver, has described this network as “a model of 
long-range, meticulous operational planning by the GRU.”15 
 
The East German communist regime founded a foreign intelligence service in 1951. It 
was called the Außenpolitischer Nachrichtendienst (Foreign Political Intelligence 
Service, APN) and was directed by the Politburo member and Deputy Foreign 
Minister Anton Ackermann. Placing the APN under his leadership followed Soviet 
practice: then the Soviet Union’s foreign intelligence services were all under the 
control of the Committee of Information (Komitet Informatsii, KI), which was chaired 
by the USSR’s Foreign Minister (then Andrei Vyshinsky).  
 
The APN’s task was to assist Soviet espionage. To begin with, it was little more than 
a local branch of the FCD. Until the late 1950s, Russian “advisers” largely ran the 
                                                 
15 Arnold Silver, “Questions, Questions, Questions: Memories of Oberursel,” 
Intelligence and National Security 8, no. 2 (1993):199-213, 210.  
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Stasi and the other GDR intelligence services.16 Though called “advisers,” they were 
in reality directors and instructors. In 1953, the APN was incorporated into the Stasi 
as its Hauptabteilung XV (HA XV: Main Department XV). After the popular uprising 
of June 1953 in the GDR, the Stasi was itself made subordinate to the Interior 
Ministry. This, again, followed the example of the USSR, where intelligence and 
security were again merged in one ministry, the MGB, which had itself, like the 
Interior Ministry, been brought under the control of one man, Lavrenti Beria. There 
was a further reorganization of the Stasi in the mid-1950s, as a result of which the HA 
XV was in 1956 renamed the HVA. 
 
The APN used the cover name Institut für Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Forschung 
(Institute for Economic Research, IWF). Its tasking was to gather economic and 
political information, mainly by penetrating ministries, political parties, and trade 
unions in Bonn. This intelligence collection was meant to give knowledge of the class 
enemy’s plans for the GDR and of the Federal Republic’s domestic politics and its 
relations with its allies.17  
 
This tasking changed with the creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1956 and the onset of 
the thermonuclear revolution. In 1955, the Soviet Union tested its first true 
thermonuclear weapon, its counterpart to the hydrogen bomb tested by the United 
                                                 
16 In addition to the Stasi and APN, there was also a military intelligence service in 
the GDR. This was the Verwaltung Aufklärung (Intelligence Directorate) of the 
Nationale Volksarmee (NVA), the intelligence department of the GDR’s armed forces 
(VA/NVA). In other words, it was the counterpart to the Soviet armed forces’ GRU.  
17 Siebenmorgen, “Staatssicherheit” der DDR, 112-13, 124.  
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States in 1952. The FCD and GRU were under strong pressure from the Soviet 
General Staff to obtain military and scientific and technological intelligence (S&TI) 
in the West. The HVA was required to play a role in this intelligence collection. In 
fact, military intelligence was more important to the USSR—as a military superpower 
that would bear the brunt of any war with the United States and its allies—than it was 
to the GDR. The GDR’s need for such intelligence was smaller: it wanted it to 
prevent war and to stir up opinion against the armed forces based in West Germany.18 
Nor, in the mid-1950s, did the GDR have much of a defense industry that could 
exploit the S&TI gathered in West Germany and other Western countries. 
 
An era of genuine liaison began in the late 1950s. The HVA’s officers were partners 
rather than subordinates. Soviet “advisers” were now called “liaison officers.” This 
was a reward for the success the HVA had begun to achieve. The HVA officers’ self-
confidence grew. The Russians saw this and gave the service more freedom of action. 
In the wake of the uprisings in East Germany and Hungary, Soviet policy was to treat 
the satellites more as equals.19 However, the FCD always received more from the 
HVA than it gave. It was always a condescending and mean senior partner. The HVA, 
like the rest of the Stasi, operated independently, but under close Russian supervision. 
The Russians had to be informed of whatever was being done. Cooperation was close 
and served chiefly the interests of the Soviet Union. For example, the FCD was very 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 127-28.  
19 Roger Engelmann, “Diener zweier Herren. Das Verhältnis der Staatssicherheit zur 
SED und den sowjetischen Beratern 1950-1959,” in Staatspartei und Staatssicherheit. 
Zum Verhältnis von SED und MfS, ed. Siegfried Suckut and Walter Süß (Berlin, 
1997), 51-72, 71-72.  
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secretive in its dealings with the HVA’s S&TI collection division, the Sektor 
Wissenschaft und Technik (SWT). It was very interested in the information the 
division collected but provided none itself. It did make prospective agents available to 
it to assist its work (from which the FCD, of course, expected to benefit).20 In the 
1980s, the HVA’s intelligence reporting department, Abteilung VII, provided the 
FCD with nine times as many assessments as it received in return.21 
 
The HVA’s success in obtaining valuable intelligence grew considerably in the 1960s 
and 1970s. By this time, the high-level penetration by the Soviet Bloc’s intelligence 
services of foreign governments, civil services, intelligence communities, and armed 
forces was more successful in the Third World than in Western countries. Thanks to 
the HVA, the Federal Republic was the main exception to this rule. The HVA had 
unique opportunities of penetrating it.22 This was the severest security problem any 
Western state faced during the Cold War. West Germany’s intelligence and security 
services were comprehensively defeated. They were progressively penetrated by 
HVA agents and, by the late Cold War, their effectiveness against the HVA and the 
rest of the Stasi had been severely reduced.23 
 
                                                 
20 Werner Stiller, Beyond the Wall (McLean, Virginia, 1992), 103-105. 
21 Müller-Enbergs, Hauptverwaltung A, 145. 
22 Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign 
Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (London, 1990), 427.  
23 Maddrell, Spying on Science, 269; cf. Dörrenberg, “Erkenntnisse des 
Verfassungsschutzes zur Westarbeit des MfS,” 85-88, 92-93, and 109.  
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The United States also had a security problem. This was caused less by the 
ideological attraction of communism than by mercenary motives; some Americans 
proved willing to betray secrets for money. So the FCD did achieve successes against 
it and particularly against its intelligence community, armed forces, and defense 
contractors. Indeed, its penetration of the US intelligence community was most 
successful at the very end of the Cold War, when the success of the HVA was in 
decline. It was then that the devastating American traitors Aldrich Ames and Robert 
Hanssen were recruited.  
 
However, on present evidence, after the very early Cold War, the FCD proved unable 
to achieve the HVA’s success in collecting high-grade political intelligence on its 
“Main Adversary” (“Glavnyi Protivnik”), the United States. The KGB’s residencies 
in the USA (and Britain) depended on recruiting low- to middle-ranking penetration 
agents with access to high-grade secrets. Its most valuable such agents worked, as a 
rule, for intelligence agencies or defense contractors and had no access to political 
information.  
 
In the late 1960s, West Germany, like the United States and other Western states, 
decided to seek a less confrontational relationship with the Soviet Union and its bloc. 
The USSR decided that negotiations were worth pursuing. It therefore had greater 
need of political intelligence to guide it in its policy. The HVA’s deepening 
penetration of the Federal Republic’s government and political parties was valuable to 
it. Spies like Karl Wienand and Günter Guillaume, an assistant to the new Social 
Democratic Chancellor Willy Brandt, provided information demonstrating that 
Brandt’s Eastern policy (“Ostpolitik”) was a genuine change in West German foreign 
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policy. Wienand’s intelligence on the SPD was much valued. The chairman of the 
SPD parliamentary party, Herbert Wehner (once a leader of the German Communist 
Party), spoke regularly to Stasi sources; a copy of the report on each conversation 
with him, edited and censored, was sent on to Moscow.24  
 
The superpowers’ move towards détente was, in part, a result of the ever-greater 
burden of the arms race.25 The progress of science and technology was speeding up 
and rising in cost. Most advances took place in Western countries. The HVA was 
again valuable to the FCD since, by giving the Russians secret access to one of the 
world’s most developed states, it made available to them a wide range of advanced 
science and technology. The Federal Republic rose steadily in importance as a target 
of S&TI collection. Consequently, the HVA’s importance rose steadily as well. The 
expansion of its operations to collect S&TI served Soviet interests. The FCD was 
itself very active in collecting S&TI in West Germany (this was the job of its Line X, 
at the head of which stood FCD Directorate T). Line X sent agents recruited in East 
Germany into the Federal Republic to penetrate companies there. It was very 
successful in penetrating them. However, much S&TI was obtained from partner 
services: in 1980, just over half of the intelligence obtained by FCD Directorate T 
                                                 
24 Karl Wilhelm Fricke, “Ein ‘Tschekist’ als Zeitzeuge,” Deutschland Archiv 5 
(1997): 821; cf. Wolf, Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg, 195-96, 209. Wehner was 
not betraying the Federal Republic and the Stasi did not regard him as its agent. 
Indeed, it considered him a dangerous enemy and tried to discredit him: see Knabe, 
Die unterwanderte Republik, 153-81.  
25 For other causes, see Raymond Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-
Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC, 1985), 5-17.  
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came from its partners, chief among them the HVA and Czechoslovakia’s StB. In that 
year, 10 percent of the S&TI supplied by Soviet intelligence agencies to the USSR’s 
Military-Industrial Commission was obtained in the Federal Republic.26 
 
The collection of military intelligence was another important HVA task whose 
priority shifted consistently in accordance with Soviet strategic fears. In 1959 and 
1968, intelligence collection requirements placed military targets in the Federal 
Republic, NATO, and the United States second in priority to political intelligence 
collection on the West. Most of the intelligence actually collected in this period 
concerned the Federal Republic.27  
 
In the mid-1970s, the collection of military intelligence became the HVA’s first 
priority. The Soviet regime and the KGB were alarmed at the rapid development of 
military electronics and the danger this created, as they saw it, of NATO attempting a 
surprise nuclear first strike. The rising popularity in American, West German, and 
Japanese politics of fierce critics of détente, such as Ronald Reagan and Franz Josef 
Strauß, also disturbed them. Consequently, it became the HVA’s overriding priority 
to collect intelligence on American and NATO military strategy and weapons 
research, development, and production in the NATO states, including the USA. The 
priority of these states was now greater than that of the Federal Republic. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, military intelligence consistently represented about 30 percent of the 
intelligence collected by the HVA.28 
                                                 
26 Andrew & Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, 597.  
27 Gieseke, Der Mielke-Konzern, 217-18.  
28 Ibid., 219-21.  
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In the early 1980s, fear in Moscow of an American first strike went up another notch 
with the rise to political pre-eminence of the KGB’s fearful chairman, Yuri 
Andropov. The KGB and GRU were in 1981 ordered to engage in a worldwide 
intelligence collection operation to obtain warning of any nuclear attack (the 
operation was code-named “RYaN,” the Russian acronym for “Nuclear Missile 
Attack”).29  
 
The HVA was less afraid of an American first strike than the KGB but played its full 
part in “RYaN,” intensifying its efforts to recruit West German and American military 
personnel and collect intelligence on targets in NATO and West Germany. Markus 
Wolf considered the operation “a burdensome waste of time.”30 Both he and his 
successor as chief of the HVA, Werner Großmann, claim to have persuaded Moscow 
by the mid-1980s that there was no immediate danger of a nuclear attack by NATO.31 
Whether this is true is uncertain; the intelligence collected by the HVA could have 
been interpreted in the opposite way, namely, as showing that the USA was trying to 
achieve a first-strike capability. This was the interpretation of the HVA’s top spy in 
NATO, Rainer Rupp, and of Klaus Eichner, one of the HVA’s experts on the US 
                                                 
29 On “RYaN,” see Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, eds., Instructions from 
the Centre: Top Secret Files from the KGB’s Foreign Operations, 1975-1985 
(London, 1991), ch. 4.  
30 Quoted in Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, 596.  
31 Wolf, Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg, 331-32.  
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intelligence community.32 The allocation of greater priority to military intelligence 
collection was not in the interests of the GDR; indeed, it conflicted with the state’s 
interests. The SED regime fell owing to political unrest, not military attack. Nor did 
the HVA’s greater efforts to obtain S&TI benefit the GDR significantly; this 
intelligence failed to stop the GDR’s economic decline.33 
 
Political intelligence supplied by the HVA remained valuable to the Russians in the 
late Cold War. Gabriele Gast, a BND analyst with responsibility for the Soviet bloc, 
provided it with BND analyses of the Solidarity resistance movement in Poland. This 
information demonstrated how much the West knew about Solidarity and what its 
view of the movement was. Wolf has commented that the information proved 
valuable to the Russians and East Germans in coping with Solidarity’s emergence.34 
In the early 1980s, as the GDR’s economic crisis deepened, its leadership showed 
more interest in intelligence on economic matters. The HVA duly collected more.35 
The service’s main priority at this time was “RYaN”— that is, a task performed on 
behalf of the Soviet Union.  
 
Intelligence methods 
 
                                                 
32 Klaus Eichner, Headquarters Germany. Die USA-Geheimdienste in Deutschland 
(Berlin, 1997), 243-45.  
33 Gieseke, Der Mielke-Konzern, 244-46. 
34 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, 588-89.  
35 Siebenmorgen, “Staatssicherheit” der DDR, 121.  
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The methods of the HVA and FCD were largely consistent throughout the Cold War 
and were those of the FCD, the HVA’s parent and teacher. Over time, they learned 
from one another, but the HVA inevitably learned more from the FCD than vice 
versa.  
 
The HVA’s most successful method was its exploitation of the migration of Germans 
and of cross-border connections between them, both of which required exploiting its 
own population. Though a foreign intelligence service, the HVA had domestic 
branches, called Abteilungen XV (Departments XV), in each district of the GDR that 
made thorough use of the numerous connections between East and West Germans.36 
The HVA was an all-German institution; it had informer networks both at home and 
abroad. The purposes of both were to secure and win advantages for the GDR.37 Its 
approach towards West Germany was exactly the same as the FCD’s approach 
towards Israel. Soviet Jews were, like Germans during the Cold War, a migrant and 
cross-border population. Both they and ethnic Germans living outside the Federal 
Republic represented a migrant and transnational community that Soviet and Russian 
intelligence agencies could exploit. They still do. 
 
The USSR’s intelligence agencies started exploiting the migration of Germans and 
Jews as soon as the Second World War ended. US military intelligence in West 
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Germany concluded in the late 1940s from its interrogations of defectors from Soviet 
intelligence and of agents that the MGB was recruiting thousands of Germans in what 
was then the Soviet Zone of Occupation to migrate to West Germany, settle there, and 
pursue careers in politics, science, the press, academic life, business, banking, trade 
unions, the police, security services, and so on. The MGB’s aim was the penetration 
of every sector of West German life over the long term.38 The HVA continued this 
policy as soon as it was established in 1951.39 Most of the MGB’s agents signed 
recruitment statements and were told that they would be contacted when they had 
established themselves in their careers. The Russians’ attitude towards the agents was 
practical; they knew that, once in the West, few would honor their promises to spy. 
Their rule of thumb was that 10 percent of them might in future become useful agents.  
 
Among the records that dissident FCD archivist, Vasili Mitrokhin, smuggled out of 
Russia to the West in 1992 were ones relating to just such spies. A spy code-named 
“Mark” was recruited in East Germany in 1946 by exploiting “compromising 
circumstances” arising from his service in the Wehrmacht. He fled to West Germany 
a few years later and pursued a political career. The FCD resumed contact with him in 
1956 and maintained contact with him for next 24 years. But, like many KGB agents 
in Israel, he seems to have provided no intelligence of significance; he clearly did not 
want to spy for the Russians.40 
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Soviet intelligence was at that time pursuing exactly the same policy with regard to 
Israel. In 1947, the Committee of Information, which then directed all the USSR’s 
intelligence agencies, instructed its Middle and Far Eastern Department to ensure that 
the new state of Israel become an ally of the Soviet Union. Agent controllers duly 
recruited many agents among the Soviet Jews then emigrating to Israel. Many were 
scientists. The KGB continued to exploit Soviet-Jewish migration to Israel throughout 
the Cold War. However, its efforts seem to have been less successful than the HVA’s 
exploitation of East German migrants to West Germany; many of the KGB’s Jewish 
migrants did not honor their promises to betray their new country.41 Israel seems to 
have established a stronger hold over them than did the Federal Republic over the 
HVA’s spies; the HVA also seems to have selected and managed its agents well.  
 
The HVA adopted the FCD’s method of mass penetration via migration. Effective 
security was impossible in West Germany in the face of such a large inflow of 
migrants (some 3.25 million between 1949 and 1961). Several thousand spies could 
not be identified among them. Consequently, it is still impossible to say how many 
agents of the FCD, HVA, and other Eastern services there were in West Germany. 
The Law on the Stasi Records42 has enabled only the spies of the HVA and the rest of 
the Stasi to be revealed. Those of the other Soviet Bloc services remain, for the most 
part, unidentified. The FCD’s operations went beyond dispatching migrants into West 
Germany, of course. Its Karlshorst residency also supplied well-trained East German 
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and Soviet “illegals” with false identities; these people were infiltrated into the 
Federal Republic via third countries.  
 
Pursuant to the Law on the Stasi Records, the Stasi’s informer network in the Federal 
Republic has been uncovered. Both the number of spies and their identities have been 
established. The spies reported to the HVA, to counterintelligence and security 
departments of the Stasi, and to the intelligence service of the Nationale Volksarmee 
(NVA, National People's Army). These services had forty years and a wealth of 
opportunities to build up their informer networks in the Federal Republic, which 
could maintain only a weak security regime to protect itself.43 Between their creation 
in the early 1950s and dissolution in 1989-90, the East German intelligence agencies 
ran informer networks among West Germans comprised of some 12,000 people, 
approximately 6,000 of whom reported to the HVA. A further 6,000 reported to other 
departments of the Stasi and to the VA/NVA.44 However, the HVA owed its success 
not to the number of its spies, but to its skillful, well-planned recruitment of agents 
and their adroit infiltration into suitable targets.45 
 
A further method of both the HVA and FCD was the exploitation of cross-border 
connections between East and West Germans. This did not involve migration; instead, 
an East German was used to recruit a West German as a spy. The HVA called these 
East Germans “the basis for operations provided by the GDR.” A fundamental 
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principle of the HVA was that the foreign connections of GDR citizens should be 
thoroughly exploited.46 The GDR provided ideal conditions for exploiting such 
connections since it was not a country: it was only part of one.  
 
The HVA exploited these cross-border connections more thoroughly after 1961, when 
the border in Berlin was closed. Thereafter, it was much harder for East Germans to 
migrate to the West. Moreover, those who did flee, being much fewer in number, 
were subjected to stringent security examination. Its Department XV in every GDR 
district liaised with the Stasi’s security divisions and passed useful information to the 
HVA. Informers identified relatives in West Germany who might be valuable sources. 
The HVA was informed when promising people were going to visit the GDR.47 
Recruitments were made. However, as a rule the West Germans concerned did not 
prove to be successful spies. The reason was their very connection with citizens of the 
GDR: this made them security risks in the eyes of West German institutions, which 
meant that the spies had difficulty gaining access to secrets. There were exceptions to 
this rule, though. In a recent study, the cases of 499 West German spies were 
researched. Of these, 51 were considered to be “Spitzen-IM” (high-grade sources). 
Ten of these 51 were recruited in the GDR owing to their family connections there.48 
 
A celebrated method of the HVA was romantic compromise by “Romeo” spies. 
Agents were sent into West Germany to seduce lonely women, often secretaries 
working for important ministries like the Defense Ministry or for the President’s 
                                                 
46 Bohnsack, Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, 97.  
47 Siebenmorgen, “Staatssicherheit” der DDR, 100. 
48 Herbstritt, Bundesbürger im Dienst der DDR-Spionage, 220.  
 24 
Office. The agents’ instructions were to obtain information over the long term by 
developing romantic relationships with these women. The originality of this method 
should not be exaggerated. Sexual compromise had long been a favorite Soviet 
method of blackmailing a targeted person into becoming a spy. Its limitation was that 
it yielded an unstable relationship with the spy, who often provided intelligence for 
only a short time. Markus Wolf preferred romantic compromise because it promised 
intelligence over the long term. This is, in fact, the only example of the HVA 
developing and improving on Soviet intelligence tradecraft. It was so obviously a 
promising method that the FCD copied it: from the late 1950s, the Russians initiated a 
“secretaries’ offensive” of their own, using East German illegals. They successfully 
penetrated West German ministries and intelligence agencies.49 
 
Joint Soviet-East German “active measures” 
 
In the field of influence operations (“active measures,” in Soviet parlance), the 
HVA’s practice was, again, that of the FCD. Indeed, the active measures units of all 
the satellite services used the same methods as the Russians. News agencies were 
established to send information to opinion-makers; suitable documents were passed to 
confidential contacts; leaflets were distributed; books published; letters written; and 
propaganda press conferences staged. For instance, HVA agent William Borm, a 
member of the Bundestag, ran a news agency that published political news, including 
information supplied by the HVA. The FCD’s disinformation department, Service A, 
supplied materials for use in these operations. Examples are parts of the diaries of 
Joseph Goebbels, which Service A handed over in the 1970s in the hope that they 
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would help the HVA revive the fading memory of Nazism. The HVA’s Abteilung X 
(Department X), created in 1966, also prepared its own materials. It was established 
to enable the HVA to assume responsibility for active measures campaigns from other 
Stasi departments, especially the Agitation Department (Abteilung Agitation). The 
FCD was behind this change.50 The two units, whose operations were closely 
coordinated, worked according to bilateral annual plans for joint operations. 
 
The Federal Republic was, of course, the HVA’s main target, just as the USA was the 
FCD's main target. Both Western states were important disinformation targets. The 
FCD’s disinformation effort against the United States was huge, conducted 
worldwide, and started as soon as World War II ended. 
 
The HVA’s greatest strength were its very good agents and contacts in West German 
politics, government, and the media. It utilized these people in influence operations, 
just as it exploited them to obtain intelligence. It sought people well suited to 
influencing West German public opinion (“multipliers,” as it called them), using them 
to infiltrate a very wide range of Stasi-created propaganda materials into West 
German public life.  
 
These joint campaigns against the USA and West Germany focused on their role in 
the West’s alliance systems; their relations with the Third World; and their relations 
with one another. The two services sought consistently to exacerbate differences 
between the United States and the Federal Republic, thus damaging their cooperation 
in all major fields. The HVA carried out varied active measures against NATO, 
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especially against the least committed NATO members (countries such as Portugal, 
Greece, and Denmark). In the 1970s, it made considerable efforts to destabilize 
Greece and Portugal as they made their way out of military dictatorships.51 While 
joint FCD-HVA operations largely concerned matters of foreign policy, operations 
conducted by the HVA alone concerned the internal politics of the Federal 
Republic.52 
 
Being inherently political, the HVA’s active measures followed political trends. In the 
1950s and 1960s, East German propaganda campaigns (like those of the FCD) 
concentrated heavily on damaging the reputations of West German politicians by 
presenting them as neo-Nazis, revanchists, and lackeys of American capitalism. As 
fuel for its campaigns, the Stasi used Wehrmacht, SS, and Nazi Party records seized 
by the Soviet army in 1945. Its standard method was to mix authentic archival 
information with falsehoods to damn the pasts of leading figures in West German 
politics, business, and the armed forces. Typical publications of this kind were the so-
called Braunbuch (Brown Book) and Graubuch (Grey Book) made public, officially, 
by the GDR’s National Front.53 
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By the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union was moving towards détente with the United 
States and its allies. The Soviet leaders saw the international political situation as less 
tense. Therefore, the active measures of the FCD and HVA became more 
constructive. They were aimed at encouraging support for Willy Brandt’s new 
Ostpolitik. The HVA sought above all to undermine the political position of the West 
German conservative parties, the CDU/CSU, which opposed détente, and thus to 
ensure that the Soviet Union got the best terms possible in the Eastern treaties. One 
operation of the period was OV “Schwarz” (“Black”), a package of active-measure 
campaigns against leading right-wing politicians in West Germany, such as Franz 
Josef Strauß, Rainer Barzel, Kurt Kiesinger, and the Federal President, Heinrich 
Lübke.54 
 
According to the 1967 plan agreed to by the two services, a dozen joint operations 
were to be carried out that year, designed above all to discredit the Federal Republic 
internationally. Leading politicians and civil servants were to be discredited with 
information about their Nazi pasts (Operation “Nazi Camarilla”). SPD politicians on 
the moderate wing of their party were to be discredited. The Federal Republic’s 
relations with the United States were to be worsened. American involvement in the 
Vietnam War (and West Germany’s support for it) were to be condemned.55  
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From the mid-1960s, active measures were also more subtle. Instead of putting across 
a crude anti-fascist message, they were concerned with encouraging disarmament 
(Operation “Mars”) or weakening NATO (Operation “Flank”). The communists’ 
long-term objective was to encourage Western European states to leave NATO. Much 
effort also went into aggravating differences between the two great Western European 
partners, West Germany and France (Operation “Discord”). Another strong strand in 
influence operations was the mobilization of Third World and non-aligned countries 
in Africa, Asia, and Latin America against the United States (Operation “Forward”). 
These operations continued until the end of the Cold War. The FCD and HVA made 
consistent efforts to influence the conferences of the Non-Aligned Movement, to 
incite Third World countries to resist “the rich USA,” and to discredit the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).56 
 
The HVA carried out influence operations across the political spectrum. It had many 
agents and contacts in the SPD whose job was to encourage the party down the road 
to détente. Left-wingers in the party were encouraged to push the party towards 
confrontation with the CDU/CSU. The HVA also sought to discredit media outlets 
and figures hostile to the GDR. Increasingly, it carried out influence operations to 
hamper the work of the Western secret services, such as OV “Dschungel” (Jungle), 
which was launched in the late 1960s.57 It was later expanded so that all the satellite 
intelligence services contributed to it, which signaled its importance to the FCD. Over 
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time, the HVA’s efforts to harm the BND were successful in sowing mistrust and 
concern about its reliability among the latter’s foreign partners.58 
 
The mid-1970s represented the peak of détente in Europe. Its centerpiece was the 
Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Stasi feared the 
subversive influence that greater contact with West Germany might have on East 
Germans.59 Consequently, détente led to no decline in active measures; only their 
targets changed. The human rights provisions of “Basket Three” of the Helsinki Final 
Act of 1975 stimulated human rights activists in the Soviet Bloc and unsettled the 
Communist rulers. Accordingly, the FCD and HVA directed their active measures 
against human rights organizations and activists. The HVA’s greater focus on the 
GDR opposition continued into the 1980s, when it undertook active measures to 
intimidate dissidents who had been expelled to West Germany and to discredit 
dissidents and peace activists in the GDR itself. The HVA was also then heavily 
involved in supporting the West German peace movement and damning NATO and 
its missile deployments in Western Europe.  
 
The HVA and FCD made joint efforts in the 1980s to encourage the peace movement 
in West Germany and other Western states. Likewise, efforts to discredit the United 
States by planting stories about American planning for a nuclear war in Europe 
(Operation “Tsunami”) in the media were conducted together. This operation lasted 
almost ten years. The two services released many secret American documents (some 
genuine, others forged) purporting to show that the United States was planning a 
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nuclear first strike. This was a brother operation to “RYaN.”60 There was a joint 
operation in 1979-80 to discredit Franz Josef Strauß as the CDU/CSU’s candidate for 
Chancellor (Operation “Cobra-2”). It had no effect on the result of the federal 
elections of 1980 (which Strauß and the CDU/CSU lost), though the FCD claimed 
that it had.61 However, the main targets of active measures in the 1980s were the 
secret services of the West; OV “Dschungel” continued. In this respect, influence 
operations very much pursued an objective of secondary importance, not a major 
political aim.62 
 
The FCD consistently exaggerated the success its active measures had achieved. In 
the early 1980s, its most important influence operation was to stir up opposition 
among West Germans to the deployment of American medium-range (MRBM) and 
intermediate-range (IRBM) ballistic missiles in the Federal Republic. The SPD did 
vote in 1983 to oppose this deployment. The FCD claimed credit for this in its reports 
to the Soviet leadership. However, the claim is an implausible one.  
 
The HVA was successful in causing scandals in West German politics and 
aggravating differences within and between West German political parties.63 
However, there is no adequate evidence that its influence operations changed the 
political course of the Federal Republic. For example, the peace movement failed to 
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prevent the deployment of MRBMs and IRBMs. A possible exception to this rule is 
the failed CDU/CSU vote of no confidence in Brandt’s coalition government in April 
1972. The motion (which failed by two votes) might have succeeded in toppling 
Brandt if the HVA had not bribed a CDU deputy, Julius Steiner, to vote with the 
government. However, public support for Brandt’s policy was strong enough for him 
to have stood a good chance of winning any election that might then have ensued. His 
coalition government did indeed win a larger parliamentary majority in the federal 
elections of November 1972.64 
 
The Chekist identity  
 
Cooperation between the HVA and FCD rested not only on joint plans and methods 
but also on a shared communist identity. This was a special form of proletarian 
internationalism: the HVA officers saw themselves as members of a transnational 
élite of communist security officials, the brotherhood of Chekists. This identity was 
an idealized self-image, made up of two parts: one Russian and one German. The first 
part was that a Stasi officer was a defender of the great communist transformation of 
the world that had begun with the Russian Revolution in 1917. Stasi officers 
identified with the Soviet Union as the home of the communist revolution and the 
leader of the international working class. They saw themselves as part of the élite of 
that working class. The HVA officers therefore accepted subordination to the FCD.  
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Added to this was the second part of their identity: an anti-fascism encouraged by the 
Second World War, the disastrous defeat of Nazism, and the construction of a 
socialist society in the GDR. Communism had particular significance for some 
Germans after 1945: Stasi officers were taught that it had redeemed Germany from its 
horrific past and ensured that Germany would not start another war. Consequently, 
their self-image required them to be furiously hostile toward the Western capitalist 
states, or “imperialists,” as they called them. “Imperialism” was seen as a malevolent 
and permanently conspiratorial force seeking to undermine communism, the true 
faith. The HVA’s task, as a foreign intelligence service, was to uncover these 
malevolent and illicit activities. Like FCD (and other KGB) officers, HVA officers 
tended to exaggerate the importance of the Western intelligence services in their 
governments’ policy-making towards the Soviet Bloc, even though they had plenty of 
information about the Western intelligence communities.65 
 
At the very top of the HVA, there was a sense of being Russian as well. Markus Wolf 
regarded himself as part Russian (having been a Soviet citizen as a young man). The 
HVA officer Hans Knaust (formerly a diplomat with Wolf in the GDR’s embassy in 
Moscow) once aptly called Wolf “a Russian” and “Moscow’s station chief in Western 
Europe.”66 An affinity with Russia prevailed among the senior officials of the entire 
Stasi in the first half of its existence. Many of the men who led it then had lived in 
exile in the Soviet Union in the 1930s and 1940s or had at least received “military-
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political” training there. The Stasi was then quite small and easy for them to 
dominate. Among such people, in addition to Wolf, were the minister himself, Erich 
Mielke, and senior officers like Richard Stahlmann (the first deputy head of the 
APN), Gustav Szinda (another senior foreign intelligence officer), and the APN’s first 
head, Anton Ackermann.  
 
However, this Russian identity grew weaker over time. The Stasi developed into a 
huge, elaborately structured bureaucracy staffed by people who had been born and 
raised in the GDR. Of the Stasi’s ruling group at the end of the 1970s—Mielke, Bruno 
Beater, Rudi Mittig, Günter Kratsch, and others—only Mielke had lived in Russia.67 
Often the Stasi’s staff were children of existing or former officers, which increasingly 
strengthened a German identity in the organization. Indeed, Mielke, with his love of 
discipline, uniforms, and weapons, gave it a very military and almost Prussian 
character. Consequently, Stasi officers suffered a dismal fate after 1990: culturally, 
they were entirely German but were rejected by their own country. Some tried to 
cultivate a Jewish identity to replace the communist one, so as to exchange the status 
of a perpetrator of crime for that of a victim. An HVA officer I interviewed, Herbert 
Brehmer, emphasized his Jewishness to me. He went out of his way to tell me that his 
grandfather, a Polish Jew by birth, had been murdered by the SS in Sachsenhausen 
camp in 1940. Both Brehmer and Markus Wolf visited Israel after the GDR’s 
collapse.68 
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In reality, the HVA was more committed to proletarian internationalism than the 
KGB. The KGB was anti-Semitic and nationalist. The HVA subordinated national 
pride to loyalty to the Soviet Union. Its hostility toward Zionism concealed some anti-
Semitism, though it was not as conspicuous as in the KGB’s case.69 From the late 
1930s, the KGB was deeply anti-Semitic; for most of the Cold War, it was the most 
anti-Semitic section of the Soviet government. Until the end of the Cold War, there 
was a total ban on Jewish entrants to it; not even half-Jews were allowed to join.70 
(Markus Wolf, whose father was Jewish, would not have been allowed to join when 
he was a Soviet citizen. Bizarrely, Wolf was utterly loyal to it throughout his life, 
which reflects his devotion to Marxism-Leninism.) The national minorities deported 
to Siberia during World War II (Chechens, Crimean Tartars, and others) were not 
permitted to join it, either.71 
 
The KGB’s anti-Semitism was clear to those who knew it. After the Six-Day War of 
1967, Wolf found it “fixated on Israel as an enemy.”72 Its anti-Semitism colored its 
view of everything. During the Prague Spring of 1968, the KGB regarded the 
Czechoslovak reform movement as the result of a Western conspiracy directed by 
Western intelligence services using Zionist agents. During the Polish crisis of 1980-
81, the FCD interpreted the prominence of Jews in the Solidarity trade union’s 
leadership as evidence of a Zionist conspiracy.73 In the 1970s and 1980s, the KGB 
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considered international Zionism to be one of the main (perhaps the main) vehicle for 
ideological subversion in the USSR. Many KGB officers believed that Western 
capitalism was controlled and directed by Jews. Zionism was second only to the 
United States as a target for KGB active measures.74 
 
Conclusions 
 
The HVA’s success in creating a large agent network in the Federal Republic that 
provided intelligence from every major part of West German society was exceptional 
among the performances of communist intelligence services against Western states. 
Western states maintained a high level of security for most of the Cold War, so the 
communists’ efforts to collect Humint and Comint (intelligence from electronic 
communications) achieved less against them than against Third World states.  
 
Western states also had educated populations, freedom of speech, and wary media, so 
communist active measures were less effective in them.75 The KGB achieved many of 
its successes in active measures targeting Third World states. The HVA’s success 
against West Germany was similar to the KGB's against India (thanks to rife 
corruption there): numerous agents provided information from within government 
ministries, intelligence agencies, and the police; and there were agents also in the 
press who channeled FCD propaganda into Indian public life. India in the 1970s was 
probably the arena for more FCD active measures than any other country in the world. 
By contrast, in some important NATO countries (Italy, for example), the FCD was 
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able to plant little more than 1 percent as many articles as it placed in the Indian 
press.76 
 
The main intelligence successes of the HVA and the rest of the Stasi were as follows. 
First, their counterintelligence collection was effective. They deeply penetrated the 
West German intelligence services and frustrated their operations against the GDR. 
Western intelligence services collected no significant Humint in the GDR in the 
1980s. They relied heavily on technical intelligence collection. The West German 
government did not realize in the late 1980s that the GDR was on the point of 
collapse; the disappointing performance of its intelligence services was one reason for 
this.77 Secondly, the HVA’s military intelligence collection was successful, at least up 
to a point. Within its region of responsibility, the HVA was capable, at more or less 
any time, of providing prompt, reliable, and substantial information on NATO’s 
military-political plans and how great the danger of war was. However, this did not 
affect the Warsaw Pact’s military strategy, which was based on Soviet ideological 
concepts and the historical legacy of the Great Patriotic War.78 Moreover, the HVA 
did not succeed in obtaining intelligence on NATO’s nuclear targeting.79 However, 
thanks to the HVA’s penetration of NATO, the Soviet General Staff did know well 
how much NATO knew about the Warsaw Pact. It was able to establish how deeply 
the Pact had been penetrated by Western intelligence operations and how effective 
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Soviet disinformation was. The HVA obtained a large volume of S&TI, but it could 
not save the GDR’s economy from deterioration and collapse. The HVA gathered a 
wealth of excellent political information, but much of it was not accepted by the 
GDR’s political leadership. 
 
Unlike the Western mass media, which did undermine East Germans’ loyalty to the 
GDR, the communists’ active measures proved to be better at small things than big. 
They could start or aggravate political scandals and differences, but they could not 
change the political course of a state. Indeed, when it came to the big things, active 
measures actually exposed the GDR to danger; psychological warfare created tension 
and did not promote peace.80 The FCD’s active measures were probably more 
successful than those of the HVA because they were conducted in a more favorable 
environment: the Third World, where the media were very credulous and the regimes 
often anti-American and unstable.81 It is clear that the FCD’s active measures 
encouraged the Soviet leadership’s delusions about the state of world politics. The 
service reported more success than it actually achieved. Boris Tumanov of the Soviet 
news magazine Ogonyok once aptly called communist propaganda “an official 
surrogate for reality.”82 The HVA’s active measures could be similarly described and 
probably also encouraged the SED’s leaders’ delusions about world events.  
 
The HVA’s officers were the better Chekists, in the proper sense of that word, than 
the officers of the FCD or KGB. The KGB of the Cold War period was very much a 
                                                 
80 See Bohnsack, Auftrag: Irreführung, 46-47.  
81 Ibid., 217.  
82 Ibid., 37.  
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product of the Stalin era: it was fiercely Russian-nationalist, anti-Semitic, and racist-
imperialist; its commitment to proletarian internationalism was superficial. It treated 
its partners as dependencies (even, to some extent, the HVA). However, the HVA was 
genuinely committed to proletarian internationalism. 
 
The FCD exploited the HVA. Their alliance was the most one-sided intelligence 
partnership in history. Its only rival is the Gehlen Organization’s alliance with US 
intelligence. There was a comprehensive transfer of intelligence (both raw 
intelligence and analyses) from the HVA to the FCD without much for the HVA in 
return. The Russians were not attached to the Germans; they abandoned them in 
1989-90. Mikhail Gorbachev did not even insist on an amnesty for the Stasi’s officers 
as a precondition of Soviet agreement to German reunification (even though Markus 
Wolf requested this of him). The relationship was one of subordination: the HVA 
took on much of the mentality of the Soviet Union and served its interests in a very 
one-sided way. 
